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stimulate innovation, which may lead to eﬃciency gains or even proﬁt increase for the reg-
ulated ﬁrms. Extant theoretical works examining the PH neglect two important aspects in
their models and analyses: ﬁrm heterogeneity and general equilibrium. In this study, we re-
visit the PH by incorporating these two features in our model and analysis. We show that the
PH holds for high-capability ﬁrms, but not for low-capability ﬁrms. Although heterogeneous
responses exist in innovation investment, the average industry productivity increases.
Keywords: pollution; heterogeneous ﬁrms; environmental regulations; Porter Hypothesis
JEL Code: Q50
∗Qiu (corresponding author): Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, larry-
qiu@hku.hk. Zhou: School of International Trade and Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics,
mzhou_cufe@126.com. Wei: School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics.
†Acknowledgement : We are truly grateful to Liu Yue for helpful discussion.
1
1 Introduction
In a controversial article, Porter and van der Linde (1995) challenge the conventional view
that stringent environmental regulations reduce ﬁrm competitiveness because of the additional
costs to meet the regulations. They argue that "properly designed environmental standards can
trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully oﬀset the cost of complying with them"
(Porter and van der Linde 1995, p. 98). This argument is well known as the Porter Hypothesis
(PH).
Porter and van der Linde (1995) use a large number of cases to support their argument. Since
the publication of their paper, the PH has been extensively scrutinized both theoretically and
empirically. Researchers often divide the PH into two versions: the "weak version" claims that
properly designed environmental regulations may spur ﬁrm innovations whereas the "strong
version" extends that properly designed regulations can increase ﬁrm performance, such as
competitiveness and proﬁts (Ambec et al., 2013). Results from existing empirical studies are
mixed partly because they are derived from data of diﬀerent countries, industries, and time
periods. The "weak version" has acquired more supportive evidence than the "strong version".
Nevertheless, ﬁndings from other recent studies provide additional supportive results to the
"strong version" (Ambec et al., 2013).1
In theoretical analysis, the PH has received signiﬁcant attention because conventional wis-
dom based on standard economic models often suggests the opposite: tightening environmental
regulations will lower revenue (e.g., in the case of pollution tax) and/or increase production cost
(e.g., in the case of emission standard), thus reducing ﬁrms’ innovation incentive because the
marginal beneﬁt from innovation decreases (Palmer et al., 1995). Models generating results in
support of the PH deviate from standard models. Many existing theoretical studies ﬁnd evidence
supporting the PH, mostly the "weak version", by introducing diﬀerent types of frictions (or
"failure") to standard models. In this study, we do not rely on ad hoc frictions to analyze the
PH. Instead, we introduce ﬁrm heterogeneity to the standard monopolistic competition model
with general equilibrium analysis and reexamine the PH, both the "weak version" and "strong
version", within this framework. Our framework is more applicable to the real world than those
in the existing theoretical studies on the PH, and it allows empirical researchers to conduct their
analysis on the basis of measurable variables and veriﬁable conditions.
Speciﬁcally, we introduce pollution and innovation investment to the model of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), which features heterogeneous ﬁrms in a monopolistically competitive industry.
To emphasize the distinguishing features of this studies compared with those in the literature,
we ﬁrst examine the partial equilibrium outcomes of the model, which is equivalent to the
1Jaﬀe et al. (1995) provide an earlier survey of this literature. Using the US data on paper mills’ technological
choice, Gray and Shadbegian (1998) ﬁnd that stricter regulations tend to divert investment from productivity
to abatement, thus hindering productivity growth. Based on OECD survey data, Lanoie et al. (2011) provide
evidence of the causal link suggested by the PH. A recent paper by Greenstone et al. (2012) uses a comprehensive
data and sophisticated method to estimate the eﬀects of environmental regulations on the competitiveness of US
manufacturing. The eﬀects are generally negative, that is, strict environmental regulations result in decreased
total factor productivity. The opposite ﬁnding is obtained for carbon monoxide regulations.
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monopoly model in Section 2. We show that a stringent environmental regulation, or an increase
in compliance cost, leads to diﬀerent responses of ﬁrms in their innovation investments. Firms
with high capability of innovation increase their investments, whereas ﬁrms with low capability
of innovation reduce their investments. Firms with the lowest capability of innovation even stop
operation and exit the market. The PH holds for some ﬁrms but not for others within the same
industry. These heterogeneous responses are due to two opposite forces in operation when the
compliance cost increases. On one hand, provided that the production scale is ﬁxed, ﬁrms are
incentivized to increase their innovation investments for improving operating eﬃciency as the
marginal beneﬁts of investment (to oﬀset the increased compliance cost) grow. On the other
hand, every ﬁrm downsizes its production scale, thus reducing the incentive to invest because
the beneﬁt of investment is shared across all units of production. Under reasonable conditions,
the negative scale eﬀect is dominated by the positive cost-oﬀsetting eﬀect for high-capability
ﬁrms, but the opposite outcome holds for low-capability ﬁrms.
When ﬁrms adjust their innovation investments and production scale, the competition en-
vironment changes. The changed competition environment further induces individual ﬁrms to
adjust their investments and production. This latter eﬀect is the general equilibrium eﬀect of
tightening environmental regulations. In the partial equilibrium case, the least capable ﬁrms exit
the market, relaxing the competition for the surviving ﬁrms and providing additional incentives
for the surviving ﬁrms to invest in innovation. If the general equilibrium eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong, the resulting equilibrium proﬁts for the most capable ﬁrms can increase despite the
rising compliance cost. This eﬀect lends support to the “strong version” of the PH. The regula-
tions may even raise the total industry investments in innovations, and thus, the whole industry
becomes more productive.
Brannlund and Lundgren (2009) and Ambec et al. (2013) provide comprehensive literature
reviews of the PH. We only discuss some of the existing theoretical studies to highlight the
connections and contributions of the present paper.
One set of studies are related to market failure. For example, Morh (2001) considers the
situation in which new technology is available but nobody adopts it because, on one hand,
there is a learning cost in adopting the new technology, and on the other hand, there is a
positive externality of using the new technology on other ﬁrms in the industry. Under such
situation, the new technology may not be introduced, resulting in a suboptimal outcome. If
the regulation authority introduces an environmental policy that forces all ﬁrms to adopt the
new technology, the outcome can be a win-win situation. Andre and Gonzalez (2009) and
Greaker (2006) also examine coordination failure under other situations: Andre and Gonzales
(2009) focus on product quality, while Greaker (2006) look into technology spillover. A common
point made in these studies is that although market fails to solve the coordination problem,
environmental regulations can. In the same vein, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) analyze ﬁrms’
capital investment decision when faced with pollution tax. They assume that ﬁrms can change
their composition of capital by installing modern machines and disposing old ones. Although
modern machines are both more productive and less pollution-intensive, installing such machines
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requires additional cost. In this setup, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) ﬁnd that increase in
production costs, resulted from stringent environmental policy, triggers a modernization of the
capital stock and thus increases average productivity. However, ﬁrms proﬁt decreases, not
supporting the "strong version" of the PH.2 Hart (2004) constructs an environmental new-
growth model, which combines two types of research (environmentally oriented and ordinary
research) with production vintages, to show that an environmental tax not only gives incentives
to reduce pollution (through more environmentally oriented research) and shifts proﬁts from old
vintages to new, but also possibly increase growth rate.
Another set of studies focus on organizational failure. By developing a principal-agent model
with renegotiation, Ambec and Barla (2002) formalize the idea that stringent environmental
regulations may help ﬁrms to overcome organization inertia and thus increase productivity.
In their model, a manager (the agent) obtains private information about the outcome of an
investment in research and development (R&D). A successful R&D program implies both a
more productive and less pollution intensive production technology. To favor revelation by the
agent, informational rent must be oﬀered to the agent. The information rent is a cost for the
principal (the owner of the ﬁrm) that reduces incentive to invest in R&D. Ambec and Barla
(2002) show that environmental regulations reduce informational rent and thus increases R&D.
The present paper is diﬀerent from the above-discussed theoretical literature in two ways.
First, all existing models assume either a single ﬁrm or many identical ﬁrms. Under such as-
sumptions, all ﬁrms respond to a change in environmental regulations in a uniform manner.
By contrast, we explicitly assume that ﬁrms within the same industry are heterogenous. Ac-
tually, ﬁrms diﬀer in many aspects. Although most studies following the recent literature of
international trade assume ﬁrm heterogeneity in production productivity (Melitz, 2003), the
present paper assumes that ﬁrms possess diﬀerent innovation capabilities. In the technology
literature, researchers have deﬁned the characteristics of innovation capability and emphas-
ized the importance of innovation capability in aﬀecting ﬁrm performance (Adler and Shenbar,
1990; Christensen, 1995; Guan and Ma, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2013). Our result that ﬁrms
with diﬀerent innovation capabilities respond to environmental regulations distinctly can help
to understand the contradictory empirical evidence found in diﬀerent studies: By pooling all
observations in a regression analysis, the estimated results only deliver the average eﬀects across
ﬁrms.3
Second, another aspect that is overlooked by previous studies is the general equilibrium eﬀect
of environmental policies. Firms’ innovation incentives depend crucially on the competitive
environment in which the ﬁrms operate. Firms’ innovations in return change the competition.
Thus, environmental regulations that apply universally to all ﬁrms in an industry ultimately
2Feichtinger et al. (2005) show that the positive result of Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) is sensitive to the
functional forms of their model and that the opposite can possibly occur when those functional forms are changed,
that is, an emission tax may actually increase the capital’s average age.
3Cao et al. (2016) ﬁnd that faced with the same environmental regulation, Chinese ﬁrms with diﬀerent pro-
ductivity make diﬀerent investments in advanced abatement technologies. This evidence supports the prediction
of their theory.
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alters the competitive environment of the industry. By considering this general equilibrium
eﬀect, the present study shows that the PH tends to be supported.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the monopoly model. In
Section 3, we examine the monopolistic competition model to emphasize the general equilibrium
eﬀect. In Section 4, we check the main results under a general consumer preference. In Section
5, we explore the case of a diﬀerent type of environmental regulation (i.e., emission standard)
as opposed to pollution tax in all other sections. In Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 Monopoly Model
In this section, we consider and analyze a monopoly model. Speciﬁcally, we assume that in an
economy, a continuum of industries exists, and these industries are symmetric and independent.
The inverse demand curve in each industry is assumed to be linear, given as p = A− bq, where
A is a demand shifter that is exogenously given.
Each industry consists of one ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm needs to invest on an innovation to obtain the
technology to produce its product. We assume that each ﬁrm obtains its innovation capability
(i.e., innovative capacity in Acemoglu et al., 2013), denoted as θ ≥ 0, randomly from a distribu-
tion G(θ). Upon realizing its draw of θ, every ﬁrm makes a decision whether to stay in or exit
its industry. If a ﬁrm stays, it ﬁrst chooses the level of innovation investment k, which gives the
ﬁrm the following production function (technology):
x =
q2
k
,
where q is the unit of output, and x is the unit of intermediate inputs required to produce q.
The cost of investment for a ﬁrm with its drawn capability θ, called a type-θ ﬁrm, is θk. Thus,
a ﬁrm’s innovation capability is higher if its θ is lower. Following Copeland and Taylor (2003),
we assume that production of the intermediate inputs generates pollution, but production of the
ﬁnal goods does not. The ﬁrm chooses and allocates labor optimally between intermediate inputs
and abatement activities. Consequently, we can assume that producing the inputs requires both
labor (l) and emission (z) in the Cobb-Douglas form described as follows:4
x = zη · l1−η, η ∈ (0, 1). (1)
4Suppose that producing intermediate inputs generates pollution as a by-product. Pollution can be reduced if
a ﬁrm puts resources into abatement activities. Assume that by allocating a fraction, ∆, of labor l into abatement
activities, the amount of intermediate inputs (x) and emission (z) is given by x = (1−∆)l, and z = ϕ(∆)l, where
0  ∆  1, ϕ(0) = 1, ϕ(1) = 0 and dϕ/d∆ < 0. As in Copeland and Taylor (2003), assume ϕ(∆) = (1 −∆)
1
η ,
where η ∈ (0, 1). We can use the above three equations to eliminate ∆, and get x = zηl1−η. Thus, although
pollution is a by-product of intermediate input production, we can equivalently view it as an input of the ﬁnal
good production.
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We suppose that each unit of pollution emission is charged with a pollution tax τ and that
the wage rate is given as w. Wage rate w is exogenously given, and so without loss of generality,
we normalize w = 1. Then, the implied minimum cost of unit input is given by
c = η−η · (1− η)−(1−η) · τη.
Thus, changes in c is equivalent to changes in τ , and for succinctness, we refer to c as compliance
cost. In what follows, we use tightening of regulation to signify that the regulation authority
raises the compliance cost c.
As c is the unit cost of input, the total production cost for a ﬁrm with investment k and
output q is given by
cx =
cq2
k
. (2)
A type-θ ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by
π(θ) = (A− bq)q − cq
2
k
− θk.
We can view a ﬁrm’s proﬁt optimization as a two-stage decision. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm
chooses the level of investment k. In the second stage, it decides on how much to produce, that
is, the level of q.
We solve the problem backwards. Conditional on k, the ﬁrm’s second-stage problem is to
maximize the operating proﬁt: Maxq≥0

(A− bq)q − cq2k

. From the ﬁrst-order condition, we
obtain the optimal quantity produced and the optimal operating proﬁt, denoted as Π(k):
q(k) = Ak
2(bk + c)
and Π(k) =
A2k
4(bk + c)
.
Moving backward, the ﬁrst-stage problem is: Maxk≥0 [Π(k)− θk]. From the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion, we obtain the optimal level of investment
k∗(θ) =
1
b

A
√
c
2
√
θ
− c

. (3)
As a result, the optimal quantity produced and price are
q∗(θ) =
A− 2
√
θc
2b
and p∗(θ) =
A+ 2
√
θc
2
.
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The corresponding proﬁt is given by
π∗(θ) = Π(k∗(θ))− θk∗(θ) = 1
4b
(A− 2
√
θc)2 (4)
Clearly, ∂k
∗(θ)
∂θ
< 0. That is, high capability ﬁrms invest more in innovation because their
investments are more eﬀective (i.e., marginal returns to investment is higher).
A ﬁrm obtains non-negative proﬁt, or can survive, if and only if k(θ) ≥ 0. On the basis of
(3), we ﬁnd that after drawing their respective θ, ﬁrms with innovation capability θ ≤ θ∗ stay
in their respective industries, whereas ﬁrms with θ > θ∗ exit their industries, where
θ∗ ≡ A
2
4c
.
An increase in the compliance cost results in a smaller cutoﬀ θ∗, that is, fewer ﬁrms can survive.
This result is the selection eﬀect.
We now evaluate the PH. In particular, we examine how a ﬁrm’s innovation investments
responds to an increase in compliance cost c. To answer this question, we derive partial derivative
of k with respect to c and obtain
∂k∗
∂c
=
1
2b
√
c

A
2
√
θ
− 2√c

. (5)
Thus,
∂k∗
∂c
> 0 if and only if θ < θˆ ≡ A
2
16c
.
The above analysis leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In the monopoly model, in response to an increase in compliance cost,
(i) marginal ﬁrms (i.e., least capable ﬁrms) exit their industries; and
(ii) for surviving ﬁrms, those with high innovation capability, θ < θˆ, increase their innovation
investments, whereas those with low innovation capability, θ ∈ (θˆ, θ∗), reduce their innovation
investments.
This proposition indicates that the “weak version” of the PH holds for high-capability ﬁrms,
but fails for low-capability ﬁrms. The question is why ﬁrms with varying levels of innovation
capability react to the same policy change in the opposite directions. Two opposing forces
arise from an increase in the compliance cost. On one hand, holding production scale constant,
operating cost increases with rising compliance cost; and thus, a ﬁrm acquires stronger incent-
ives to undertake more R&D to oﬀset the increased compliance cost. That is, the marginal
beneﬁt of innovation increases. On the other hand, when the compliance cost rises, a ﬁrm’s
production scale shrinks, which reduces R&D incentives because the marginal beneﬁt of innov-
ation decreases. The proposition implies that for high-capability ﬁrms, the positive eﬀect (i.e.,
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cost-oﬀsetting eﬀect) dominates, whereas for low-capability ﬁrms, the negative eﬀect (i.e., scale
eﬀect) dominates. The following analysis demonstrates such diﬀerence.
We reconsider a ﬁrm’s decision as the following two stages, which are equivalent to the
maximization analyzed earlier to obtain (3). In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm chooses k to minimize
its total cost (including variable cost and investment cost) for any given quantity produced:
Mink≥0

cq2
k + θk

. This decision yields the investment function: k = k(q, c) =

c
θq. From
which we obtain
∂k
∂c
=
q
2
√
θc
> 0 and
∂k
∂q
=
	
c
θ
> 0.
The ﬁrst property shows that holding q constant, when c increases, the ﬁrm has an incentive
to increase k. This consequence is the cost-oﬀsetting eﬀect. The second property indicates that
when q is higher, the ﬁrm has an incentive to increase k. This outcome is the scale eﬀect. The
functional form k(q, c) is independent of the preference (demand) structure. That is, these two
eﬀects are general.
In the second stage, taking the k(q, c) schedule as given, the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by
choosing the optimal quantity to produce: Maxq≥0

(A− bq)q − c(τ)q2
k(q,c) − θk(q, c)

. This choice
determines the optimal quantity produced: q = q(c). Substituting back into the k function, we
obtain the optimal investment: k(c) = k(q(c), c). Taking full derivative to derive
dk(c)
dc
=
∂k
∂c
+
∂k
∂q
dq
dc
=
∂k
∂c
− ∂k
∂q
q
c
ǫqc
=
q
2
√
θc
−
	
c
θ
q
c
ǫqc =
q√
θc

1
2
− ǫqc

=
q√
θc

1
2
− ǫpcǫqp

,
where
ǫqc = −dq
dc
c
q
, ǫpc =
dp
dc
c
p
, and ǫqp = −dq
dp
p
q
.
As a result,
sign


dk(c)
dc

= sign

1
2
− ǫpcǫqp

.
In equilibrium, the low-θ ﬁrms always produce more (i.e., q is higher). Under a linear
demand, the high-capability ﬁrms are producing at the inelastic range of the demand curve,
implying a lower ǫqp for them. When cost increases, the markup of high-capability ﬁrms are
higher, allowing for a lower pass-through (lower ǫpc). These two features together explain a
positive sign of dk(c)
dc
for high-capability ﬁrms (i.e., 12 − ǫpcǫqp > 0), and a reversed sign for
low-capability ﬁrms because both ǫpc and ǫqp are large for them.
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3 Monopolistic-competition model: General equilibrium eﬀects
The preceding analysis shows how individual ﬁrms in their respective monopolist industries
adjust their innovation investments directly in response to regulation changes. Regulations may
also alter the competitive environment in the market where ﬁrms operate, which in turn further
aﬀects ﬁrms’ innovation incentives. This consequence can be viewed as the indirect eﬀect of
regulation. In the previous section, we deliberately omitted the indirect eﬀect to emphasize
the direct eﬀect. We did that by assuming that ﬁrms are monopolists, each in a diﬀerent
(independent) industry. To capture the indirect eﬀect, we now assume that all ﬁrms are in
the same industry characterized by monopolistic competition. In particular, all ﬁrms produce
diﬀerentiated but substitutable goods. To keep the model similar to the previous one as much
as possible, we adopt the consumer preference of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), which results
in linear demand for each product variety (ﬁrm). Speciﬁcally, we assume that L identical
consumers exist and each (representative) consumer has the following quasi-linear preference on
the industry’s products:
U = qc0 + α

i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2
β

i∈Ω
qcidi
2
− 1
2
γ

i∈Ω
(qci )
2 di,
where α, β, and γ are positive parameters, qc0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, Ω is
the set of all varieties from the industry, and qci is the consumption of variety i produced by ﬁrm
i. A consumer maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint. We assume that consumers
have positive demands for the numeraire good. Then, market demand for variety i from all L
consumers is pi = α− βL

j∈Ω qjdj− γLqi. Parameter β measures substitutability among varieties.
Let M be the measure of Ω and P =

i∈Ω pidi be the aggregate price of all varieties. Then,
the demand function for variety i can be written as
pi = A− bqi, where b = γ
L
and A =
αγ + βP
βM + γ
. (6)
We are not stressing the roles of γ and L, and thus, without loss of generality, we suppose γ = L
to obtain b = 1, which saves notation.
Competition from all varieties is completely captured in the vertical intercept (A) of the
demand function. For example, holding other things constant, if M (the measure of active
ﬁrms) increases, then A decreases. The reason is that a larger number of ﬁrms in the market
reﬂects stronger competition, which eﬀectively reduces the size of residual demand for each
ﬁrm. If on average the industry’s aggregate price (P ) drops, competition becomes tougher, and
the residual demand for each ﬁrm shrinks correspondingly.5 When compliance cost changes,
individual ﬁrms responds to the change directly, which results in changes in M (selection eﬀect)
5We can view the model/analysis in Section 2 as a partial equilibrium of the present model. In particular, in
the current model, if each ﬁrm treats its demand shifter A ﬁxed when adjusting its innovation investment and
production decision, the situation is exactly the same as in the monopoly model.
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and P . Consequently, A changes, which further induces changes in individual ﬁrms’ innovation
incentives. This outcome is the general equilibrium eﬀect, which is absent in the previous model.
To simplify the ensuing analysis and to follow the literature, we parameterize the model by
assuming that the innovation-capability parameter θ follows a Pareto distribution with cumulat-
ive distribution function G(θ) = θσ, for θ ∈ [0, 1], where σ > 0. Before entering into the market,
ﬁrms have no information about their cost parameter θ, but they know the distribution. Entry is
costly, and each ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed and irreversible cost F . After paying the entry cost, each
ﬁrm draws its θ randomly from G(θ). Upon knowing its own type, each ﬁrm decides whether to
stay or exit the market. If it stays, it decides its innovation investment and production.
Given A, each ﬁrm’s decision is similar that analyzed in the previous section, only ﬁrms with
θ < θ∗ = A
2
4c can survive in the market. Let N denote the number of ﬁrms that pay the ﬁxed
entry cost. This N is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Then, we obtain the number of
surviving ﬁrms as
M = NG(θ∗). (7)
Aggregate price is obtained by integrating individual prices of all surviving ﬁrms, which is
P = N
 θ∗
0
p(θ)dG(θ) = N
 θ∗
0

A
2
+
√
θc

dG(θ) =
(4σ + 1)A2σ+1N
2(2σ + 1) (4c)σ
. (8)
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6), we obtain
(4c)σ =
βN
2(2σ + 1)γ

A2σ+1
α−A

, (9)
which deﬁnes the equilibrium relationship between A and N .
Prior to entry, the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm is
 θ∗
0 π
∗(θ)dG(θ)− F , where π∗(θ) is given in
(4). Free entry yields the condition of zero expected proﬁt. Using (2) and (4), the free-entry
condition becomes  θ∗
0
π∗(θ)dG(θ) =
 θ∗
0
1
4
(A− 2
√
θc)2dG(θ) = F.
N does not enter into the free-entry condition directly. Thus, this condition alone suﬃces
to pin down equilibrium A. After some manipulations, we obtain
A = ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
σ
2(σ+1) , where ζ = 2[(2σ + 1)(σ + 1)]
1
2(σ+1) . (10)
ζ is a constant. (9) and (10) yield the equilibrium number of entrants
N =
22σ+1(2σ + 1)γ
β

α−A
A2σ+1

cσ =
22σ+1(2σ + 1)γ
βζF
2σ+1
2(σ+1)

αc
σ
2(σ+1) − ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
σ
σ+1

. (11)
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Substituting the equilibriumA from (10) in θ∗ = A
2
4c , we obtain the equilibrium exit threshold
θ∗e =
1
4
ζ2F
1
σ+1 c
− 1
σ+1 .
Clearly, ∂θ
∗
e
∂c < 0. A more stringent regulation raises the cost for every ﬁrm and makes the least
capable ﬁrms, which have very low proﬁts before the change of regulation, unproﬁtable. These
ﬁrms drop out from the market. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is given by
M = NG(θ∗e) = N (θ
∗
e)
σ =
22σ−1(2σ + 1)γ
β
ζF
1−2σ
2(σ+1)

αc
− σ
2(σ+1) − ζF 12(σ+1)

,
and so dM
dc
< 0. Furthermore, from (10), we have ∂A
∂c
> 0. Hence, an increase in compliance cost
causes an upward shift of the demand intercept for each surviving ﬁrm. We note that
P =
(4σ + 1)A2σ+1N
2(2σ + 1) (4c)σ
=
(4σ + 1) γζ2σ
β

α− ζF 12(σ+1) c σ2(σ+1)

,
and thus ∂P∂c < 0. P decreases as c increases because the surviving ﬁrms are more productive
on average. As A = αγ+βPβM+γ , the property of
∂A
∂c > 0 must be because the eﬀect of the decrease
in M (i.e., selection eﬀect) dominates that of the decrease in P.
We now turn to the eﬀect of an increase in compliance cost c on ﬁrms’ innovation investments.
For any given A, the optimal k is given as in (3). With A being endogenously determined, the
eﬀect can be decomposed to two parts as
dk
dc
=
∂k
∂c
+
∂k
∂A
∂A
∂c
.
The ﬁrst part is the partial equilibrium eﬀect (or the direct eﬀect mentioned earlier), which
takes A as given and unchanged. This eﬀect has been analyzed in the previous section and more
speciﬁcally in (5). The second part is the general equilibrium eﬀect. An increase in c causes
a change in the competitive environment, A, which in turn aﬀects k. This eﬀect is positive
because ∂k
∂A
> 0 and ∂A
∂c
> 0. Thus, in general equilibrium, surviving ﬁrms have stronger
innovation incentives than in the case of partial equilibrium.
By substituting (10) back into (3), we obtain the equilibrium expression of k as
k∗ =

ζ
2
√
θ
F
1
2(σ+1) c
2σ+1
2(σ+1) − c

. (12)
Direct diﬀerentiation gives
dk∗
dc
=

2σ + 1
2σ + 2


ζ
2
√
θ

F
1
2(σ+1) c
− 1
2(σ+1) − 1, (13)
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from which, we obtain
dk∗
dc
> 0 if and only if θ < θˆe ≡

2σ + 1
2σ + 2
2
θ∗e.
Thus, heterogeneous responses remain present. In response to more stringent regulations, high-
capability ﬁrms increase their innovation investments, whereas low-capability ﬁrms reduce their
innovation investments.
An interesting question is why the innovation investments of low-capability ﬁrms continue
to decrease although the general equilibrium eﬀect raises all ﬁrms’ investment incentives. We
notice that
∂A
∂c
=
σ
2(σ + 1)
ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
− σ+2
2(σ+1) and
∂k
∂A
=
√
c
2b
√
θ
.
As c increases, A increases, which in turn raises k for all ﬁrms. However, ∂k
∂A
is smaller for larger
θ. That is, the general equilibrium eﬀect for low-capability ﬁrms is excessively small that it is
dominated by the partial equilibrium eﬀect, which is negative for them.
In addition,
θˆe
θ∗e
=

2σ + 1
2σ + 2
2
>
1
4
=
θˆ
θ∗
.
Thus, under Pareto distribution, the above relationship implies that conditional on survival,
a larger fraction of ﬁrms increase their innovation investment, as predicted by the PH, in the
general equilibrium analysis than that in partial equilibrium.
3.1 The “strong version” of Porter Hypothesis
Porter and van der Linde (1995) posit the possibility that after an increase in compliance cost,
even the proﬁtability of ﬁrms may increase in certain cases. We have already shown that after
an increase in compliance cost, The residual demand for all the surviving ﬁrms increases along
with the innovation investments of high-capability ﬁrms. The question is whether these positive
eﬀects are suﬃciently strong to oﬀset the negative eﬀect from the cost increase. We evaluate
this "strong version" of PH in this subsection.
By substituting (10) and (12) into (4), we obtain the equilibrium proﬁt π∗(θ, c) = 14ζ
2F
1
σ+1 c
σ
σ+1−
2ζ
√
θF
1
2(σ+1) c
2σ+1
2(σ+1) . Taking derivative with respect to c, we obtain
∂π∗
∂c
=


ζ
4
σ
2σ + 1
F
1
2(σ+1) c
−1
2(σ+1) −
√
θ

(2σ + 1)F
1
2(σ+1) ζc
−1
2(σ+1)
σ + 1
,
which is positive if and only if
θ < θs ≡ 1
16

σ
2σ + 1
2
ζ2F
1
σ+1 c
−1
σ+1 =
1
4

2σ
2σ + 1
2
θ∗e < θˆe.
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Hence, we have θs < θˆe < θ
∗
e. We state the above result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. As a result of tightening regulation,
(i) marginal ﬁrms (i.e., lowest-capability ﬁrms) ( θ > θ∗e) exit the market;
(ii) low-capability ﬁrms ( θˆe < θ < θ
∗
e) reduce their innovation investment and their proﬁts
fall;
(iii) high-capability ﬁrms ( θs < θ < θˆe) increase their innovation investment but their proﬁts
fall; and
(iv) highest-capability ﬁrms ( θ < θs) increase their innovation investment and their proﬁts
increase.
The sorting pattern described above is shown graphically in Figure 1. The intuition behind
the proposition is as follow. First, although the negative cost shock hurts all ﬁrms, the damage
to the more capable ﬁrms is relatively less because their demand elasticity is smaller. Second,
the more capable ﬁrms increase their innovation investment to oﬀset (partly) the negative eﬀect
of the cost increase. Third, the exit of some ﬁrms from the industry beneﬁts all ﬁrms staying
in the industry (selection eﬀect). These features have implications on both productivity and
proﬁts of diﬀerent ﬁrms at various degrees. When these eﬀects are very strong, we have case
(iv), and when they are less strong, we have cases (ii) and (iii). The least capable ﬁrms do not
have these two beneﬁts, and thus exit the market.
In the monopoly model, although the "weak version" of the PH holds for the high-capability
ﬁrms, the “strong version” never holds as all ﬁrms’ proﬁts drop after pollution tax increases.
By contrast, the result of Proposition 2(iv) supports the "strong version" of the PH. These
two models together indicate that the eﬃciency gain from increased investments per se is not
suﬃciently strong to raise proﬁts, but the eﬃciency gain together with the selection eﬀect raises
proﬁts.
3.2 Entry and composition of ﬁrms
In the preceding analysis, we focus on individual ﬁrms ex post decisions of innovation investment
and output. In this subsection, we examine ex ante entry and ex post composition of each type
of ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Taking derivative of the number of entrants N from (11) with respect to c, we obtain
dN
dc
> 0, if and only if ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
σ
2(σ+1) <
α
2
.
The condition ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
σ
2(σ+1) < α2 implies low initial compliance cost. The intuition is as
follows. Firms make their ex ante entry decisions on the basis of the expected proﬁts. On one
hand, an increased c exerts a direct and negative eﬀect on every ﬁrm’s probability. On the
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other hand, increasing c exerts an indirect and positive eﬀect on every surviving ﬁrm because
of the increased demand intercept A in general equilibrium. When c is small, the latter eﬀect
dominates, which encourages entry. On the contrary, when c is already large, the former eﬀect
dominates; and thus, entry is discouraged.
Under the condition of low c, as the compliance cost increases, more entrants ex ante exist
(N increases) along with more exiters ex post (M decreases). These two results, together with
the fact that only the high-capability ﬁrms can survive, imply the eﬀects of compliance cost on
the composition of ﬁrms, as depicted in Figure 2. We state this result in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If initial compliance cost is low, speciﬁcally, ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
σ
2(σ+1) < α2 , then, an
increase in the compliance cost induces more entry to the industry and a larger number of high-
capability ﬁrms remain in the industry, whereas a larger number of low-capability ﬁrms exit.
If, however, the initial compliance cost is high (ζF
1
2(σ+1) c
σ
2(σ+1) > α2 ), we have
dN
dc
< 0 (and
dM
dc
< 0). As a result, when the compliance cost increases, the number of entrants decreases
along with the number of surviving ﬁrms at every capability level.
3.3 Industry level productivity
In this subsection, we analyze another aspect of industry at the aggregate level, namely, the
total and average level of industry innovation investments, or productivity.
Productivity is determined by innovation investment. We have shown that changes in com-
pliance cost results in heterogenous responses from ﬁrms in their equilibrium innovation invest-
ments. Thus, we need further investigation to obtain industry-level innovation investments.
First, the aggregate innovation investments of the industry can be obtained as
14
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K(c) = N
 θ∗e(c)
0
k∗(θ, c)dG(θ) =
2σ + 1
2σ − 1
2γς2σ−1
βF
1
2(σ+1)

αc
σ+2
2(σ+1) − ζF 12(σ+1) c

.
Evidently,
dK
dc
> 0, if and only if c <


(σ + 2)α
2 (σ + 1) ς
 2(σ+1)
σ
F−
1
σ .
Thus, as c continuously increase from an initially low level, the aggregate innovation investments
of the entire industry ﬁrst increase but then decrease. That is, K has an inverted-U shape with
respect to c.
Conditional on surviving, we deﬁne and obtain the average investments as
k(c) =
1
G (θ∗e)
 θ∗e(c)
0
k∗ (θ, c) dG (θ) =
c
2σ − 1 .
The above result is obtained under the condition σ > 12 , without which the integrand becomes
not integrable on [0, θ∗e(c)]. Under this condition, k is an increasing function of c.
The intuition for the changes of total and average industry-level innovation investments in
response to changes in regulation is as follows. When the regulation becomes tightened, three
types of changes occur in ﬁrms. First, the least-capability ﬁrms exit. Second, the low-capability
ﬁrms reduce their investment level. Third, the high-capability ﬁrms increase their investment
level. The ﬁrst two changes reduce the total industry investment, whereas the last change
raises total industry investment. When the compliance cost is small, the distribution of ﬁrms
favors high-capability ﬁrms as Proposition 3 indicates. Thus, total industry investments tend to
increase. However, when the compliance cost is high, fewer high-capability ﬁrms increase their
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investment; and thus, total industry investments tend to drop. As for the average investment,
the number of ﬁrms staying in the industry after an increase in compliance cost decreases, and
the average capability of the staying ﬁrms increases. Hence, average investment always increases
although total investment may decrease.
4 A general model
In the preceding sections, we have obtained results supporting the PH based on models with
linear demand for individual ﬁrms’ products. We now show that the PH holds in general models.
To do so, we follow Zhelobodko et al. (2012) in considering one class of consumer preferences in
which consumers’ utility function is additive separable. In particular, we suppose thatN varieties
of diﬀerentiated goods, indexed by i ∈ [0,N ], are available in the market, and a representative
consumer’s utility is given as
U =
 N
0
u(qi)di, with u(0) = 0, u
′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0.
The individual utility function u(·) is continuous and diﬀerentiable. The consumer optimization
problem is
max
{qi≥0}Ni=0
 N
0
u(qi)di, s.t.
 N
0
piqidi = w,
where w is the consumer’s income to be spent on these diﬀerentiated goods, and we normalize
w = 1. From the ﬁrst-order condition, we obtain the inverse demand function for each variety
(i ∈ [0, N ]) as
pi =
1
λ
u′(qi),
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
As in the preceding sections, each ﬁrm draws its innovation capability θ from G(θ) after
paying the ﬁxed entry fee F . After observing their θ, some ﬁrms may exit the industry. All
remaining ﬁrms make their respective investment in innovation and engage in monopolistic
competition in the product market. Each ﬁrm treats the Lagrange multiplier λ as an exogenous
parameter when making its decisions. As ﬁrms are symmetric in the product market, we omit
subscript i in the analysis below for simplicity. Faced with λ and c, a type-θ ﬁrm obtains its
operating proﬁt net of investment cost as
π∗ (θ, λ; c) = max
{k≥0,q≥0}


1
λ
u′(q)q − cq
2
k
− θk

.
From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to k, we obtain cq
2
k2
= θ. Thus, π∗ (θ, λ; c) can be
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written as
π∗ (θ, λ; c) = max
{q≥0}


1
λ
u′(q)q − 2
√
θcq

. (14)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to q gives
u′′(q)q + u′(q) = 2λ
√
θc, (15)
which determines the optimal quantity of a type-θ ﬁrm. We denote this optimal quantity as
q = q (θ, λ; c).
Assume that the second-order condition is satisﬁed, which means u′′′(q)q+2u′′(q) < 0. Then,
based on the ﬁrst-order condition (15) and the second-order condition, for any given λ and c, q
is an decreasing function of θ: ∂q∂θ < 0.
Every ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed cost of production, f .6 The following equation deﬁne the cutoﬀ
capability level, θ∗(λ; c),
π∗ (θ∗, λ; c)− f = 0. (16)
Applying the envelope theorem to (14) gives ∂π
∗
∂θ < 0. Thus, ﬁrms with θ ≤ θ∗ stay, and those
with θ > θ∗ exit the market.
Finally, the free-entry condition is given by
 θ∗(λ;c)
0
[π∗ (θ, λ; c)− f ]dG(θ) = F. (17)
By applying the envelope theorem to (14) again, we obtain ∂π
∗
∂λ
< 0. Using this property,
together with ∂π
∗
∂θ
< 0, in (17), we obtain ∂θ
∗(λ;c)
∂λ
< 0. Thus, the left-hand-side of the free-
entry condition is decreasing in λ. The left-hand-side approaches inﬁnity when λ → 0, and
it reaches zero when λ is suﬃciently large because θ∗(λ; c) approaches 0. By the intermediate
value theorem, a unique solution of λ exists, denoted as λ∗ = λ∗(c) > 0, such that the free-entry
condition holds. Accordingly, we obtain the equilibrium cut-oﬀ eﬃciency point θ∗(c) = θ(λ∗; c)
and equilibrium quantity qθ(c) = q (θ
∗, λ∗; c), as functions of c. k =

c
θ
q ; thus, we obtain the
equilibrium investment kθ(c) =

c
θ
qθ of the type-θ ﬁrm.
Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium quantity qθ with respect to c, we derive
dqθ
dc
=
∂q
∂c
+
∂q
∂λ
dλ
dc
. (18)
Evaluating the ﬁrst-order condition (15) at equilibrium and taking diﬀerentiation, we obtain

u′′′(qθ)qθ + 2u
′′(qθ)
 ∂q
∂λ
= 2
√
θc, and

u′′′(qθ)qθ + 2u
′′(qθ)
 ∂q
∂c
= λ∗
	
θ
c
.
6We do not need the ﬁxed cost of production in the models of previous sections to determine the threshold θ
because of linear demand.
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Substituting these expressions into (18), we obtain
dqθ
dc
=
λ∗
u′′′(qθ)qθ + 2u′′(qθ)
	
θ
c
+
2
√
θc
u′′′(qθ)qθ + 2u′′(qθ)
dλ∗
dc
.
We introduce a general notation ǫx to denote the elasticity of variable x with respect to c,
that is,
ǫx =
d ln(x)
d ln(c)
.
Then,
dqθ
dc
=
λ∗

θ
c
u′′′(qθ)qθ + 2u′′(qθ)
(1 + 2ǫλ∗) .
Using the ﬁrst-order condition (15), we obtain
ǫqθ =
1
2
u′′(qθ)qθ + u
′(qθ)
u′′′(qθ)qθ + 2u′′ (qθ)
1 + 2ǫλ∗
qθ
.
We now calculate ǫλ from the free-entry condition. Evaluating the free entry condition at
equilibrium, diﬀerentiating with respect to c, and noticing that the value of the integrand is zero
at θ∗, we can simply write the total derivative as
 θ∗
0

∂π∗
∂c
+
∂π∗
∂λ
dλ∗
dc

dG(θ) = 0.
By applying the envelope theorem to (14), we obtain
∂π∗
∂c
= −q (θ, λ; c)
	
θ
c
,
∂π∗
∂θ
= −q (θ, λ; c)
	
c
θ
,
and
∂π∗
∂λ
= − 1
λ2
u′[q (θ, λ; c)]q (θ, λ; c) .
After manipulation, we obtain
 θ∗
0
[R(θ)ǫλ∗ + qθ
√
θc]dG(θ) = 0, where R(θ) =
1
λ∗
u′(qθ)qθ.
R(θ) is the equilibrium revenue of a type-θ ﬁrm. As ǫλ∗ is independent of θ, it can be solved
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from the above equation as
ǫλ∗ = −
 θ∗
0 V (θ)dG(θ)
2
 θ∗
0 R(θ)dG(θ)
,
where V (θ) = 2qθ
√
θc =
cq2
θ
kθ
+ θkθ is the variable cost of production plus investment cost for a
type-θ ﬁrm.
ǫλ∗ ∈
−12 , 0 because 0 < V (θ) < R (θ) for all θ < θ∗. As a result, from the expression of
qθ, we always obtain ǫqθ < 0. That is, in response to a more stringent environmental regulation,
the surviving ﬁrms decrease their equilibrium production scale.
On the basis of kθ =

c
θqθ, we obtain
ǫkθ =
1
2
+ ǫqθ .
Deﬁne
MR(q) =
1
λ
[u′′(q)q + u′(q)],
which is the marginal revenue function. Inserting the expression of ǫqθ , we ﬁnd that ǫkθ > 0 if
and only if
MR(q)
MR′(q)q
> − 1
2ǫλ + 1
∈ (−∞,−1). (19)
That is, if inequality (19) holds for a ﬁrm, the ﬁrm will increase its innovation investment in
response to a more stringent environmental regulation. We explore conditions for the above
inequality under two cases.
Case 1. The MR(q) curve crosses the horizontal axis once.
Result 1: If ∃ qφ ∈ (0,+∞), such that u′′(qφ)qφ+u′(qφ) = 0, then ∃ ε > 0, when θ∗ ∈ [0, ε),
ǫkθ > 0.
To prove this result, we rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition (15) as MR(q) = 2
√
θc . Given the
equilibrium λ∗, this condition pins down the equilibrium q = qθ for each ﬁrm with θ. As the
second-order condition implies that MR(q) is a decreasing function of q, we obtain that qθ is a
decreasing function of θ. Then, supposing that ∃ qφ ∈ (0,+∞), such that u′′(qφ)qφ+u′(qφ) = 0,
we obtain MR(qφ) = 0, which implies θ = 0 for the ﬁrms with qφ. That is, qφ is the equilibrium
quantity of every type-0 ﬁrm, that is, q0 = qφ. As a result,
MR(q0)
MR′(q0)q0
= 0 > −1 > − 1
2ǫλ + 1
.
By continuity, the inequality (19) holds for certain neighborhood of θ = 0, completing the proof.
One example is the utility function which takes a CARA form (Behrens and Murata, 2007),
such as u(q) = 1 − e−mq, where m > 0. Then, u′(q) = me−mq, u′′(q) = −m2e−mq, and so
MR(q) = m(1− q)e−mq, which crosses the horizontal axis at q0 = 1 and only once.
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Case 2. The MR(q) curve does not cross the horizontal axis.
Result 2: Supposing that for any q ∈ (0,+∞), then, u′′(q)q+u′(q) > 0, and limq→+∞ u′′(q)q+
u′(q) = 0. We deﬁne g(x) = MR( 1x). If g(x) is locally convex at x = 0, then ∃ ε > 0, when
θ∗ ∈ [0, ε), ǫkθ > 0.
We now prove the above result. g(0) = limx→0MR(
1
x) =
1
λ limq→+∞ u
′′(q)q + u′(q) = 0.
Then
lim
q→+∞
MR(q)
MR′(q) · q = limx→0
MR( 1x)
MR′( 1
x
) · 1
x
= lim
x→0
g(x)
g′(x) · (−x2) · 1
x
= lim
x→0
−
g(x)−g(0)
x−0
g′(x)
.
As g(x) > 0, if g(x) is convex at x = 0, then g(x)−g(0)
x−0 < g
′(x) in the neighborhood of x = 0.
Consequently, the following result holds in the neighborhood of x = 0:
lim
x→0
g(x)−g(0)
x−0
g′(x)
 1.
Thus,
lim
q→+∞
MR(q)
MR′(q) · q = limx→0−
g(x)−g(0)
x−0
g′(x)
 −1 > − 1
2ǫλ + 1
.
For example, we let the utility function be of the Stone-Geary form, that is, u(q) = log(1+q).
Then, u′(q) = 11+q , u
′′(q) = − 1
(1+q)2
, and so u′′(q)q + u′(q) = 1
(1+q)2
, which does not cross
the horizontal axis. Moreover, g (x) = 1λ

x
1+x
2
, which is locally convex at x = 0 because
g′′ (0) = 2 > 0.
5 Emission standard
The objective of this extension is to show that qualitatively similar results can be obtained for
diﬀerent types of environmental regulations. For this purpose, we focus on emission standard and
simplify the analysis by restricting to the monopoly model (one monopolist in one industry), as
in Section 2. We suppose that the ﬁrm (monopolist) in a particular industry draws its innovation
capability θ. Emission intensity is deﬁned as the emission level per unit of ﬁnal goods output.
The government imposes an emission standard ρ, that is, the ﬁrm emission intensity must be
no higher than ρ.
Unlike in the preceding analysis where we hide the pollution level in the background, now we
need to address it explicitly. The ﬁrm allocates a fraction, ∆ ∈ (0, 1), of labor into abatement
activities, and the rest for intermediate inputs production. Moreover, if the ﬁrm employs l units
of labor, the amount of intermediate inputs produced is x = (1−∆)l and the emission level is
z = (1−∆) 1η l, where η ∈ (0, 1). Given the ﬁnal goods output q, with the intermediate inputs
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requirement function x = q
2
k , we obtain the labor requirement as a function of q:
l =
q2
(1−∆)k ,
which is also the variable cost function under the normalization w = 1. Clearly, the larger the
fraction of labor is devoted to abatement, the larger is the amount of labor required to produce
a given quantity of the ﬁnal product.
The emission intensity, e, can be deﬁned and calculated as
e ≡ z
q
=
z
x
x
q
= (1−∆) 1η−1 q
k
. (20)
Thus, the ﬁrm’s maximization problem is7
Max{∆,k,q}


(A− bq)q − q
2
(1−∆)k − θk

, s.t. (1−∆) 1η−1 q
k
 ρ and ∆ ≥ 0.
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium outcomes, and then examine how the ﬁrm’s innovation
investment changes when the emission standard is tightened.
If constraint e ≤ ρ is not binding for the ﬁrm, then it is always optimal to set ∆ = 0.
Intuitively, if the ﬁrm’s emission intensity is already low or the emission standard is not high
(large ρ), production resources need not be diverted into abatement activities. Under such a
situation, the ﬁrm’s optimization problem becomes
Max{k,q}


(A− bq)q − q
2
k
− θk

.
From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to k, we obtain qk =
√
θ, which implies e =
√
θ. Thus,
if θ < ρ2, the ﬁrm automatically meets the emission standard without putting any resources
into abatement activity. The ﬁrm’s optimal decision is
∆ = 0, q =
A− 2
√
θ
2b
, and k =
A− 2
√
θ
2b
√
θ
. (21)
The ﬁrm survives if and only if k > 0, or θ < A
2
4 .
To summarize this part for all industries, if ρ > A2 , then only ﬁrms with θ ∈ (0, A
2
4 ) survive,
the emission standard are not binding for them, and their optimal decisions are given in (21);
if ρ < A2 , then ﬁrms with θ ∈ (0, ρ2) do not ﬁnd the emission standard binding and thus their
optimal decisions are given in (21), but ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, A24 ) ﬁnd the constraint binding. We
7 Implicilty, another constraint, β ≤ 1, exists.
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need to analyze separately the optimal decisions of ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, A24 ).
To save space, we fully characterize the outcomes under a given emission standard ρ in the
following lemma and leave the proof in the Appendix. In the lemma, we only present the results
of the surviving ﬁrms. Other ﬁrms exit their respective industries under various situations. We
ﬁrst deﬁne a cut-oﬀ point
θ˜ ≡ (1− η)
1−η
(2− η)2−ηA
2−ηρη.
Lemma 1. (i). If ρ  12A, then ﬁrms with θ ∈ (0, A
2
4 ) have their optimal decisions as given by
(21).
(ii). If 1−η2−ηA ≤ ρ < 12A, then ﬁrms with θ ∈ (0, ρ2] have their optimal decisions as given by
(21); and ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ(A− ρ)) have their optimal decisions as q = A−ρ−
θ
ρ
2b , k =
A−ρ− θ
ρ
2bρ ,
and ∆ = 0.
(iii). If 0 < ρ < 1−η2−ηA, then ﬁrms with θ ∈ (0, ρ2] have their optimal decisions as given
by (21); ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ21−η ] have their optimal decisions as q =
A−ρ− θ
ρ
2b , k =
A−ρ− θ
ρ
2bρ , and
∆ = 0; ﬁrms with θ ∈ ( ρ21−η , θ˜) have their solutions as q = 12b

A− 2−η1−ηρ
− η
2−η (1− η) 12−η θ 12−η

,
k =
Aρ
−
η
2−η−(2−η)(1−η)
−
1−η
2−η θ
1
2−η

ρ
−
η
2−η
2
2b[(1−η)θ]
1−η
2−η
, and ∆ = 1− [(1− η) θ]−
η
2−η ρ
2η
2−η .
With the above equilibrium outcomes, we examine how ﬁrms’ innovation investment changes
in response to tightening of emission standard (i.e., reduction of ρ). We state the results in the
following proposition and provide a proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. If the government tightens the emission standard, then the least capable ﬁrms
decrease their innovation investments, ﬁrms with medium levels of capability increase their in-
vestments, and the most capable ﬁrms do not adjust their investment levels.
The result is similar to that in pollutions tax in the sense that tightening environmental
regulations induce the high-capability ﬁrms to increase their innovation investments. This result
supports the "weak version" of the PH. The only diﬀerence is that the highest-capability ﬁrms
also increase their investment in the case of pollution tax, but keep their investment levels
unchanged in the case of emission standard. This is not surprising because in the case of emission
standard, the highest-capability ﬁrms have very low emission intensity and thus tightening of
emission standard does not aﬀect them, whereas a change in pollution tax aﬀects every ﬁrm
regardless of its innovation capability.8
8Tightening the emission standard also drives out the least capable ﬁrms from the markets in some cases, but
not in all cases. This outcome is another diﬀerence from the eﬀects of raising pollution tax.
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6 Conclusion
The PH stimulates heated debates in both public policy circle and academic research. The
empirical evidence is inconclusive, which is not surprising because the empirical studies are
based on data of diﬀerent countries, industries, and time periods. Even Porter and van der
Linde (1995) claim that only properly designed environmental regulations may induce more
innovations and raise ﬁrm performance. The environmental regulations in reality are not likely
to be properly designed.
Theoretical investigations of the PH are important because they can help identify reasons
and conditions for the PH to hold, which in turn provides guidance for empirical analysis. Critics
of the PH is not always doubtful about the validity of the PH in some cases, but challenges the
generality of the PH. The existing studies in the theoretical literature of the PH have identiﬁed a
number of situations, with market or organizational failure, in which the PH holds. The present
paper pushes this frontier further by showing that both the "weak version" and "strong version"
of the PH can hold in situations without market or organizational failure. It holds in a model
of monopolistic competition with heterogenous ﬁrms. The two distinguishing features of this
model and analysis, namely, ﬁrm heterogeneity and general equilibrium, add valuable insights
to the PH debate.
The main conclusion from the present study that the PH holds for the more capable ﬁrms
but fails for the less capable ﬁrms within the same industry should be general. We have derived
this result from the monopolistic competition model, with linear demand and general demand,
with pollution tax and emission standard. It would be important to show that the result holds
in more general settings. It would be even more important to bring this prediction to data
for empirical veriﬁcation. Cao et al. (2016) provide evidence consistent with this prediction
although they focus on investments in advanced abatement technology, rather than eﬃciency-
improving innovation investments.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
We divide the proof into four steps. The ﬁrst step has been given in the text which leads to
the result of (i).
Step 2. For (ii), we suppose ρ < A2 , and consider ﬁrms with cost parameter θ  ρ
2. The
earlier analysis shows that if these ﬁrms continue to set∆ = 0, the emission constraint is binding.
Thus, the question is whether they should continue to set ∆ = 0 and adjust other decisions to
meet the constraint, or set ∆ > 0. We approach this issue by guess-and-verify below.
We suppose that the constraint is binding but ∆ > 0 for a ﬁrm with θ  ρ2. Substitut-
ing e =
√
θ into the objective function to eliminate ∆, the maximization problem becomes
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Max{k,q}

(A− bq)q − ρ−
η
1−η q
2−η
1−η k
− 1
1−η − θk

. The optimal solutions are
q (θ) =
1
2b


A− 2− η
1− ηρ
− η
2−η (1− η) 12−η θ 12−η

, ((A1))
and
k (θ) =
Aρ
− η
2−η − (2− η) (1− η)−
1−η
2−η θ
1
2−η

ρ
− η
2−η
2
2b [(1− η) θ]
1−η
2−η
. ((A2))
The above results are based on the assumption that ∆ > 0. We now check whether this is
the case. Using the above results in e =
√
θ, we obtain 1 −∆ = [(1− η) θ]−
η
2−η ρ
2η
2−η . We ﬁnd
that 1−∆ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if θ > ρ21−η , that is, the assumption that ∆ ∈ (0, 1) is only valid
for ﬁrms with θ > ρ
2
1−η . For ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ
2
1−η ), we must have ∆ = 0.
Step 3. We consider ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ21−η ). With ∆ = 0 and e =
√
θ, the optimization
problem becomes Max{q,k}

(A− bq)q − q2k − θk

, s.t. qk = ρ. The solutions are
q (θ) =
1
2b


A−

ρ+
θ
ρ

and k (θ) =
1
2b

A
ρ
− θ
ρ2
− 1

.
If k > 0 for any θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ21−η ), then we must have k (θ) > 0 for θ = ρ
2
1−η (because k is decreasing
in θ), that is, k

ρ2
1−η

> 0, or equivalently ρ < 1−η2−ηA. On the contrary, if ρ >
1−η
2−ηA, then
only ﬁrms with ρ2 < θ < ρ (A− ρ) have positive k (θ) and can survive, whereas ﬁrms with
θ ∈ (ρ (A− ρ) , ρ21−η ) exit the market. They exit the market because they cannot set ∆ > 0, as
we have already proved in Step 2. Furthermore, because ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ (A− ρ) , ρ21−η ) can not
survive, ﬁrms with θ > ρ
2
1−η can not survive either (because a ﬁrm with a lower θ has a larger
choice set). We ﬁnd that if ρ < A2 , then ρ (A− ρ) > ρ2, which implies that (ρ2, ρ (A− ρ)) is
non-empty.
Step 4. The remaining situation to consider is what happens to ﬁrms with θ > ρ
2
1−η when
ρ < 1−η2−ηA. From step 2, we know that when θ >
ρ2
1−η ,the solution is given by (A1) and (A2),
with ∆ > 0. Again, for ﬁrms to survive, we must have k > 0, which implies θ < θ˜. This condition
holds when ρ < 1−η2−ηA.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i). If ρ  12A, then tightening emission standard exerts no eﬀect on the investment decision
of any surviving ﬁrm.
(ii). If 12A > ρ >
1−η
2−ηA, then the regulation exerts no eﬀect on investment of ﬁrms with
θ ∈ (0, ρ2]. However, for ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ(A − ρ)), ∂k
∂ρ
= 1
2bρ2
(2θ −Aρ) . Apparently,
∂k
∂ρ ≷ 0 if and only if θ ≷
Aρ
2 . Under the current parameter range,
Aρ
2 ∈ (ρ2, ρ(A − ρ)).
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Therefore, ∂k
∂ρ
< 0 for θ ∈ (ρ2, Aρ2 ), and ∂k∂ρ > 0 for θ ∈ (Aρ2 , ρ(A − ρ)), which implies that,
facing a tightening of regulation, ﬁrms with low capability decrease their investments, those
with medium-level capability increase their investments, whereas the most capable ﬁrms do not
adjust their decisions.
(iii). If ρ  1−η2−ηA, as before, then the regulation exerts no eﬀect on the investments of ﬁrms
with θ ∈ (0, ρ2]. For ﬁrms with θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ21−η ), ∂k∂ρ = 12bρ2 (2θ −Aρ). As a result, ∂k∂ρ ≷ 0 for
θ ≷ Aρ2 . For ﬁrms with θ ∈ [ ρ
2
1−η , θ˜),
∂k
∂ρ
=
η
2bρ
2
2−η

2θ
1
2−η
(1− η)
1−η
2−η ρ
η
2−η
− 1
2− ηA

.
Hence, ∂k
∂ρ
≷ 0 for θ ≷ 1
22−η
θ∗. We ﬁnd that
Aρ
2

ρ2
1− η ⇐⇒ ρ 
1− η
2
A,
1
22−η
θ˜ =
(1− η)1−η
22−η (2− η)2−ηA
2−ηρη 
ρ2
1− η ⇐⇒ ρ 
1− η
2 (2− η)A.
Depending on the location of the two critical points (Aρ2 and
1
22−η θ˜), three scenarios should be
considered to sign ∂k
∂ρ
.
Scenario 1: ρ  1−η2(2−η)A. Then,
∂k
∂ρ = 0 for θ ∈ [0, ρ2], ∂k∂ρ < 0 for θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ
2
1−η )∪[ ρ
2
1−η ,
1
22−η θ
∗),
and ∂k
∂ρ
> 0 for θ ∈ ( 1
22−η
θ∗, θ∗).
Scenario 2: 1−η2(2−η)A < ρ <
1−η
2 A. Then,
∂k
∂ρ = 0 for θ ∈ [0, ρ2], ∂k∂ρ < 0 for θ ∈ (ρ2, ρ
2
1−η ) and
∂k
∂ρ > 0 for θ ∈ ( ρ
2
1−η , θ˜).
Scenario 3: 12A > ρ 
1−η
2 A. Then,
∂k
∂ρ = 0 for θ ∈ [0, ρ2], ∂k∂ρ < 0 for θ ∈ (ρ2, Aρ2 ), and
∂k
∂ρ
> 0 for θ ∈ (Aρ2 , θ˜).
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